Abstract -
INTRODUCTION

W
hen two hijacked Boeing 767 aircraft struck the twin towers of the World Trade Center on the morning of September 11, 2001 and caused them to collapse, New York City suffered an enormous and horrifying blow. In this paper, we assess the economic and fi scal costs of 9/11, and the federal fi nancial response to the disaster. The paper has four parts. The fi rst section discusses the economic impacts. The second section describes the fi scal impacts. The third section describes the federal response. The fourth section considers some of the issues in intergovernmental compensation for disasters in cities. The fi fth section concludes.
OVERALL ECONOMIC EFFECTS
The immediate economic losses were staggering. Estimates from the New York City Offi ce of the Comptroller (2002) are
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NY and 9/11 that some $13.4 billion of offi ce space was destroyed, and $16.6 billion was damaged. Economic activity in lower Manhattan all but ceased for several weeks. Some 13,000 jobs, mainly in the fi nancial sector, were immediately relocated outside of the city. Economic losses quickly spread from the immediate site of the attack to key New York City industries, including travel and tourism. Between 75,000 and 100,000 jobs were lost in New York City during the fourth quarter of 2001 as an immediate result of the attack. Gross City Product fell by $11.5 billion in the quarter following the attack and roughly $17.6 billion by July of 2002. Employment data from 2003 suggest that the impact of the attack, though still very substantial, was somewhat less than originally thought, down to 60,000, with income losses in the range of $5 billion (Bram, 2003) . This reassessment refl ects the fact that the decline in New York City's economy in the period preceding the attack, from its cyclical peak of 3.8 million jobs in December of 2000, was greater than indicated by the initial data.
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Short-Run Effects
Looking at both real estate and labor markets, we fi nd evidence of signifi cant dislocations to the short-run trajectory of New York City's overall activity levels that can reasonably be attributed to the 9/11 attacks. The New York City Index of Coincident Economic Indicators, an employment and earnings based measure of economic activity in the city, began falling as the local recession commenced in January 2001 and declined nearly 0.95 percent in September 2001 alone. The total decline for the full 2001-2003 downturn was 8.9 percent The rates of decline before and after September 2001 are approximately the same, suggesting that the ongoing national recession was an important factor in the adverse outcomes in the city economy. Nonetheless, the fact that the national economy began to grow sometime in late 2001 or early 2002 while the city continued to decline for 20 more months suggests that the attack had a signifi cant negative effect on the short-run performance of the overall city economy.
Additional evidence of short-run effects of the attack may be found in the city's real estate markets. Based on regression analysis using the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey, we fi nd that apartment rentals in most of New York were essentially fl at relative to the nation.
2 A remarkable exception to this pattern is the Downtown market, which strengthened both in absolute terms and relative to the nation. While part of the divergence between rental markets in Lower Manhattan and the rest of the city may be attributable to incentives for residents to locate in this area, our tentative conclusion is that rents in Lower Manhattan rose even net of the value of these subsidies.
The attack destroyed or rendered temporarily or permanently unusable nearly 28 million square feet of class A offi ce space, 13.4 million of which was in the World Trade Center complex itself. In spite of these losses, the offi ce vacancy rate in Manhattan rose in late 2001, led by a sharp increase in the Downtown market. The exodus of jobs from Lower Manhattan would, thus, appear to have exceeded those directly displaced from unusable space. However, there is some evidence that fi rms economized on space by reducing their allocations of space per employee, and that signifi cant amounts of "shadow space"-available space that was not measured as vacant-served to absorb some of the employees displaced from Downtown (Fuerst, 2005) . Figure 1 shows trends in the rental price of offi ce space in New York's two central business districts-Downtown and Midtown-relative to the nation.
3 It indicates that offi ce rents declined nearly nine percent between 2001 and 2002, suggesting that demand fell at the same time as supply. A decline in demand is consistent with Glaeser and Shapiro's (2002) view that the attack hastened the decline of Lower Manhattan as a principal site for New York City offi ce locations. We conclude from Figure 1 that both Midtown and Downtown commercial rents softened signifi cantly in the wake of the 9/11 attack.
Long-Run Effects of 9/11
We focus on building prices as an indication of changes in demand for New York City locations. Overall, we detect little evidence of permanent effects of an ongoing "terror tax" on either the city or suburban land markets, whether the land is currently occupied by businesses or households. We do, however, note some weakness in the expected future of the downtown offi ce market. Figure 2 shows the quarterly Offi ce of Federal Housing Oversight single-family home price index for the New York metropolitan area, divided by the national index. There is little evidence here that the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center reduced the long-run demand for residential locations in the New York metropolitan area. Repeat-sale house prices in the metropolitan area were rising faster than in the rest of the nation both before and after the attack, as shown by the steady rise in the index on both sides of the 9/11 point. Thus, the New York area's residential housing market gained ground on the rest of the nation immediately after the attack. Using the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (HVS), which allows consideration of rental apartments and condominiums, as well as single family homes, regressions show that housing prices in all geographic areas of New York City grew signifi cantly more rapidly than the national Consumer Price Index for Urban Areas (CPIU) in 2002. Taken as a whole, there is no evidence of declines in prices for residential property that can be attributed to the 9/11 attack. Demand for residential locations in New York remained very robust.
The Market for Offi ce Buildings
The relative sales price of offi ce buildings depicted in Figure 3 reveals an interesting pattern both before and after 9/11. While holding essentially steady relative to the nation for the entire period between 1985 and 2003, the Downtown offi ce market rallied from a trough in 1998. The relative price index stood at 111.5 on the eve of September 2001. By the close of 2001, the Downtown market had given back all its gains relative to the nation, and the index reached a recent low of 96.8 in 2002-Q3. There is modest evidence here of a rally in the Downtown market since that point, as the index rose back above the break-even point (at 101.6) by 2003-Q3. Downtown offi ce prices remain below the very high and perhaps anomalous peak they reached immediately prior to 9/11. However, the fact that the Downtown offi ce market stabilized in the subsequent two years provides some indication that demanders continue to fi nd locations there attractive. By the end of the period, the relative Downtown price index was about three percent higher than it had been three years earlier. Given the dislocations associated with the clean-up and re-design of the World Trade Center and surrounding areas, Downtown demand has held up reasonably well relative to the nation. On the other hand, there is some evidence, as suggested by Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) , of a post-attack shift in demand to Midtown, where prices have rallied strongly relative to both the nation and to Downtown since mid-2001. The challenge facing the city in the wake of 9/11 can, therefore, be characterized as a need to offset the effects of a large, but temporary, shock to the private economy. How the city managed its own fi nances is the subject of the next section.
THE FISCAL EFFECTS OF 9/11
The combination of national recession, the bursting of the high-tech bubble, and the 9/11 attack led to a severe deterioration in the fi scal condition of New York City. To cover operating defi cits in the year of the attack, New York City issued an additional $2.1 billion in long-term debt, at an annual cost of about $165 million. To deal with large projected budget defi cits-up to $6.4 billion, or 14 percent of total expenditures, in 2004-the city cut expenditures, raised taxes, and substituted federal for local spending. In this section, we estimate the public sector costs imposed on New York City by the 9/11 attack, and compare those costs to the level of federal compensation.
Though our goal in this section is to assess the fi scal costs of 9/11, our approach is based on changes in the welfare of the residents of New York City. The government's function is to provide the services demanded by its residents and collect suffi cient revenues to pay for those services. Economic well-being is assumed to depend on after-tax income and the level of public services. The loss suffered by New York residents due to the 9/11 attack can be separated into the loss in pre-tax income and the loss through the public sector. The loss through the public sector is equal to the increased tax rate required to offset the loss in tax base from the disaster and pay for any increase in service costs and transfers. The analytical approach for measuring public sector costs is presented in Chernick (2005) .
Measurement of Losses
In this section, we provide estimates of the components of the public sector loss and federal compensation. Cost fl ows of more than one year are discounted at a social discount rate of 3.5 percent (Moore, Boardman, Vining, Weimer and Greenberg, 2004) . Results are summarized in Table 1 . The expenditure costs and tax losses are based on estimates from the New York City Offi ce of the Comptroller and Offi ce of Management and Budget. It should be stressed that most of the fi gures are approximations, depending as they do on educated guesses about what would have happened to tax revenues or Medicaid enrollment had there been no 9/11 attack.
As shown in Figure 4 , public assistance and Food Stamp caseloads were little changed after 9/11. By contrast, Medicaid caseloads grew dramatically. From September 2001 to May 2002, the number of Medicaid recipients grew by 25 percent, from 1,617,000 to slightly more than two million. A major reason for this increase was the temporary relaxation of eligibility requirements after 9/11, called Disaster Relief Medicaid (DRM). Some 380,000 individuals signed up for DRM. Once the fourmonth period for DRM was over, about 138,000 enrolled in regular Medicaid. The increase in Medicaid eligibility imposed a direct fi scal $130 million in annual city-funded Medicaid expenditures in FY02. 4 Counties in New York pay 25 percent of regular expenditures under Medicaid. Hence, the total increase in transfers is equal to $520 million, four times the local contribution. City residents in their dual capacity as state taxpayers must also bear a proportionate share of the 25 percent of the Medicaid costs borne by the state. Hence, the net benefi ts to New York City residents of the increased Medicaid transfers can be approximated by:
per capita.
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Other than Medicaid, the main sources of increased expenditure for New York City from 9/11 have been for increased overtime and security costs. The city also faces higher pension costs, and exposure to higher claims costs. The city has had to add as many as 1,400 offi cers a day for additional security measures, with overtime costs of $379 million. City liability for claims are estimated at $350 million. Extra pension expenses include $64.6 million for city employees who died in the attacks and potential expenses in the future from increased disability rates. Estimates of additional pension expenses are about $39 million per year from FY03 through FY06.
6 Additional capital costs to replace damaged or destroyed equipment and buildings are estimated at $171 Large amounts of overtime raised the salaries of many police and fi refi ghters by substantial amounts. The inclusion of this extra pay in the pension calculation provided a strong incentive for many police-and fi re-department members to retire after 20 years. In addition, the trauma of the attack itself has led to increased retirements. Conceptually, the loss in tax revenues due to 9/11 is equal to:
where τ is the pre-9/11 tax rate, ΔB(attack) is the loss in tax base due to the 9/11 attack, and ΔTax policy is the increase in revenues due to an increase in tax rates on the 9/11-induced lower tax base. The actual change in tax revenues from 2001 to 2002 was a negative $1.5 billion, or 6.4 percent of revenues. September 11-related tax losses were $926 million-4.3 percent of tax revenues-in 2002 and $1.6 billion-7.1 percent of revenues-in 2003 after accounting for policy changes (New York City Office of Management and Budget, 2004) .
7 Property tax losses are estimated at about $125 million at least until 2010. Over two years the per-capita loss is $330, ($2.472 billion), and over eight years it is $488.
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To address the FY03 and FY04 budget defi cits, property, sales, and income tax rates were all increased substantially. 10 The magnitude of this increase, which exceeds substantially the increase associated with the previous economic downturn of the early 1990s, suggests the crucial role played by tax increases in closing large budget defi cits caused by the 9/11 attack and the recession.
Tax was due to increases in tax rates, but rate-adjusted revenues rose 12.1 percent in FY05, and 7.9 percent (projected) in FY06. The strong post-9/11 market for residential and commercial property, described in the first section, has translated into a sharp increase in revenues from property 7 Assuming an overall tax rate of seven percent of personal income, or about 5.5 percent of Gross City Product, the estimated tax losses exceed by a considerable amount the losses that would be implied by our earlier estimate of a loss in GCP of $5 billion. A portion of the difference stems from the fact that the attack also left destroyed or damaged nearly 28 million square feet of offi ce space, with a market value of about $30 billion dollars, causing signifi cant losses in property tax revenue. 8 The calculation is: PDV of Tax Losseses (02-10) = $926 million (02) + $1.546 billion (03) + $495 million (04) + $491 million (05) + $492 million (06-10) = $3.95 billion = $488 per capita. 9 Property tax rates were raised by 18.5 percent, the top bracket for the personal income tax (PIT) was increased from 3.65 percent to 4.45 percent for taxable incomes greater than $500,000, the sales tax rate was raised by 0.125 percentage points, bringing the combined rate to 8.625 percent, and there was a temporary suspension of the sales tax exemption on clothing for items costing less than $110. 10 A rough calculation is that about two thirds of the increase in the tax burden represents policy actions, while the remaining third represents the automatic increase in tax burdens when personal income declines. This calculation is made under the assumption that the property tax, which provided about 30 percent of tax revenues in 2001, is fi xed in the short run. Despite some evidence that past tax increases in New York City have had an adverse effect on the tax base, the robust growth in income and real estate values since 9/11 suggests that any such effect after 9/11 has been small (Haughwout and Rabin, 2005) . 12 Negative effects have been muted by the temporary nature of most of the increases, the historically low own-tax burden prior to 9/11, and the reduction in overlying federal and state income tax burdens in recent years, particularly for high-income taxpayers.
FISCAL CRISIS
Rates have also risen in the neighboring counties, reducing somewhat the competitive pressure that New York City would face if it were the only jurisdiction raising its taxes.
THE FISCAL ROLE OF NEW YORK STATE
In assessing the fi scal impact of disasters in cities, the state is both a casualty and a potential rescuer. The state's own fi scal capacity will be directly affected by the loss of tax base in the affected areas, particularly if it shares the same tax base. The state may also shift some of the costs of the disaster from the residents to all residents of the state, by reallocating fi scal resources. In the 9/11 attack, the main effect was the concomitant loss of state fi scal capacity.
Because the New York City economy makes up more than 50 percent of gross state product, the fi scal shock to New York City was also a fi scal shock to New York State. The state effect is magnifi ed because the city and the state share common tax bases for the sales and personal income tax, and the state's 11 percent loss in revenue in 2002-2003 substantially exceeded the 6.4 percent loss to New York City. The reduction was greater for the state because all the major revenue sources for the state are sensitive to economic conditions in the short run, while the city's property tax is more stable.
A rough estimate of the one-year loss in tax revenues to New York State due to 9/11 can be given by taking an estimate of the decline in Gross City Product of $17.5 billion (New York City Offi ce of the Comptroller, 2002) , and multiplying that amount by the average New York State tax rate of six percent. 13 This gives an estimate of $1.05 billion. Multiplying by the personal income share in New York City yields a state tax loss to New York City residents of about $473 million, or $59 per capita. Adding this amount to the total city costs gives a total loss through the public sector equal to $459 per resident, and $641 through 2010.
The main state fi scal response to 9/11 was to grant New York City the legal authority to raise income and sales tax rates and issue additional long-term debt for operating expenses. Over the Governor's veto, the state legislature also agreed to assume some $500 million of prior debt obligations of New York City. The state also signed off on the temporary relaxation of Medicaid eligibility rules and, 11 Revenues from the 2.5 percent tax on transactions went from $500 million per year in the early 1990s to $1. 
Federal Compensation to the Government of New York City
While typically the federal government does not provide general fi scal relief to governments that have been hit by natural disasters, in the case of the 9/11 attack about eight percent of the total federal reimbursement was provided to the city of New York. Of that amount, $762 million went for unrestricted budgetary relief. The other part of general relief was achieved by waiving federal rules on the one-time refi nancing of municipal debt, thus allowing New York City to take advantage of lower interest rates for some of its general obligation and agency debt. The cost to the federal government of this provision is estimated at $937 billion. Estimated budget savings in FY03 are about $500 million (New York City Offi ce of the Comptroller, 2002) . 15 Using the $500 million fi gure, general federal budget compensation was $1.31 billion, or $162 per capita.
Net Public Sector Cost to New York City Residents
Subtracting federal compensation of $162 per capita, the net public sector cost is $297, while the eight-year cost is $479. 16 Taking into account deductibility and Medicaid matching, as well as specifi c compensation, the present discounted value of total federal compensation offsets about half of the public sector costs.
FEDERAL AID TO NEW YORK CITY
In the aftermath of 9/11, President Bush pledged $20 billion in aid to New York City to assist with recovery. The aid has come in three allotments: 1) September 11 Emergency Appropriations that totaled $11.235 billion and provided cash assistance to individuals, local governments and small businesses; 2) the Liberty Zone Economic Package, enacted in Spring 2002, that granted $5 billion in tax relief to businesses located in downtown Manhattan; and 3) a supplementary emergency 14 A number of fi scal policy initiatives taken by the state in the 1990s have had an adverse impact on New York City's fi scal base or its costs. These include the elimination of the commuter tax in 1999, a state funded property tax relief program with a distributional formula favoring the suburbs over the city, and state level intervention in collective bargaining for pension rights (see Center for an Urban Future (2002)). The distribution of state aid is discussed in Chernick and Reschovsky (2001) . The elimination of the commuter tax is considered in Chernick and Tkacheva (2002) . 15 In a later report, the Comptroller uses the $937 million fi gure (New York City Offi ce of the Comptroller, 2004) .
The Liberty Zone Economic Package also includes $1.2 billion in savings from allowing New York City and New York State to issue $8 billion in tax exempt bonds, to be used for private investment in offi ces, residential units, and utilities. 16 Schlain (2004) estimates that the rate of offset for the income tax surcharge is 21 percent. Because income taxes are much higher than sales taxes in New York, very few taxpayers choose the option of deducting the sales tax. Property tax payments are spread more equally through the income distribution than the income tax surcharge. Hence, we use a lower fi gure of 15 percent as the average rate of deductibility. A variety of geographically targeted tax benefi ts were enacted to benefi t downtown businesses. These tax benefi ts were originally valued by the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation at $2.9 billion over the 11-year period from 2002-2012. The benefits included $631 million in tax credits for businesses that hired or retained employees; $2.2 billion in accelerated depreciation for new equipment; and other changes. The deadline for getting the tax benefi ts was set to expire at the end of 2005. Take-up of these benefi ts has been substantially below the amount available, due to the slow pace of rebuilding in lower Manhattan. 17 Moreover, portions of the accelerated depreciation benefits were superseded by increased depreciation for all firms under the 2003 Tax Act. Therefore, the mayor and the governor proposed that $2 billion be converted to tax incentives to generate funding for transportation infrastructure.
If adopted by Congress, the tax credit measure would terminate certain existing Liberty Zone tax incentives, while providing the city and the state with a new tax credit to be taken against the employer's share of Medicare payroll taxes. Tax credits would be granted over a ten-year period, with an indefi nite forward roll for any unused credits. The credit could be used for expenditures on any transportation project in or connecting to the Liberty Zone.
The largest component of the third phase of aid is $4.55 billion for rebuilding the transportation infrastructure in the downtown area. The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 contains a number of provisions to help rebuild parts of lower Manhattan. Chief among these is the $8 billion Liberty Bond Program, a new type of private activity bond to help fi nance the reconstruction of commercial and residential property in lower Manhattan. About $6.4 billion of the bond program is dedicated to commercial projects, and $1.6 billion, to residential projects. The estimated cost to the federal government of the extra bonding authority under the Liberty Bonds is $1.2 billion over the life of the bonds.
Liberty Bonds provide bonding authority that is outside of New York State's volume limitation on private activity, so users do not have to compete for an allocation of the private activity volume limitation. In addition, the interest accruing on Liberty Bonds is not subject to the alternative minimum tax, which means that Liberty Bonds can be marketed at lower interest rates than traditional private activity bonds. Given the high proportion of New York City and state fi lers who are subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), this latter provision increases the potential demand for the bonds by residents of New York City. 18 Initially there was a more rapid take-up of Liberty Bonds for residential activity than for commercial activity and, as of 2004, the 20 percent residential portion was oversubscribed. This differential pattern of take-up refl ects 17 The Comptroller reports that three years after the attack, only 8.4 percent of retailers and 13.7 percent of commercial establishments had applied for the credit (New York City Offi ce of the Comptroller, 2004). 18 Liberty Bonds for construction may also benefi t from the preferential rules afforded to construction fi nancing, so net earnings from investment of bond proceeds during a project's construction period do not have to be rebated to the Treasury Department if the bond proceeds are spent within two years of the issuance of the bonds.
the strong overall demand for housing in Manhattan and the change towards residential uses of space in lower Manhattan. As discussed in Section I, this change has been accelerated by the World Trade Center attack. To date, the largest single commitment of Liberty Bond funds for commercial activity is $1 billion for building a new headquarters for the investment banking fi rm Goldman Sachs at Battery Park City. Although the use of tax exempt bonds to support one of the most profitable fi rms in the fi nancial sector is dubious on equity grounds, Goldman Sachs is viewed as a crucial anchor tenant for the entire downtown area. Recent research on the highly localized nature of agglomeration economies in cities (Rosenthal and Strange, 2005) would seem to provide some support for this view.
FEDERALISM AND DISASTER RELIEF: ASSESSING THE 9/11 RESPONSE The 9/11 attack has again demonstrated that the core economies of large cities tend to be quite resilient to disasters, whether from war, terrorism, or forces of nature.
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Nonetheless, when a catastrophic disaster strikes a city, there is likely to be strong pressure for publicly provided compensation for losses. What principles should underlie the intergovernmental fiscal response to disasters in cities? 20 The equity argument for compensation is that the citizens of a federation, by virtue of membership in the federation, are entitled to some minimum level of public services, at reasonable tax rates. When disaster strikes, this implicit contract binds governments, as the agents of the citizenry, to help each other in minimizing the interruption to vital public services.
21
The federal government is the appropriate agent for implementing this contract. The extent of compensation for a disaster should conform to the equalization standards of the federation.
22
Some risk sharing among members of the federation can also be justified on efficiency grounds. However, the moral hazard argument is different for terrorism than for natural disasters. Terrorist attacks are likely to be more effective-i.e., cause more disruption to the economy and spread more anxiety-if carried out in large cities. It is the very density of settlement that makes cities attractive targets and increases the risk of attacks. This "terror tax" on density is fundamentally different than the ineffi ciencies from overdevelopment in fl ood plains or hurricane-prone areas. Given the importance of agglomeration economies to economy-wide productivity, the economy as a whole bears the cost of deconcentration in response to the perceived risk of terrorism. Though large cities can never be completely protected from terrorism, the deadweight loss from the terror tax will be reduced if some portion of the tax is shifted from local residents and workers to the nation as a whole.
To minimize the moral hazard from underinvestment in safety and overdevelopment of risk-prone areas, intergovernmental compensation should not 19 Davis and Weinstein (2000) document the recovery of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from nuclear attack. Horwich (2000) discusses the rapidity with which regional output was restored in Kobe, Japan, despite the high level of devastation caused by the 1995 earthquake. However, he does not discuss the relative roles of the local and national governments in fi nancing the recovery. 20 As pointed out by Wildasin (2006) , these are important issues in the design of fi scal federalism, both because of the magnitude of the resources at stake and because the institutional design has important effi ciency implications for both the regional and national economies.
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In the aftermath of hurricane Katrina, the widespread dismay at the extent of suffering in New Orleans and the apparent ineffectiveness of the national response are a refl ection of this implicit contract. 22 A recent study estimates the rate of federal offset to regional shocks at between ten and 20 percent (Melitz and Zumer, 2002) .
offset completely the losses incurred. A signifi cant proportion of the costs of 9/11 was borne locally, with little adverse effect on the city's economy. 23 To minimize ex-post strategic behavior on the part of cities, some of the compensation should carry with it a local matching requirement. In the case of 9/11, the federal government provided the equivalent of a lump-sum grant for immediate clean-up of the affected site. This is appropriate, since in this activity there is no possibility of substituting federal for local funds. Other federal funds going to New York have an implicit matching component in that the total available is probably less than needed to fully replace and improve the damaged infrastructure. Since local information is superior to higher level information, aid should be in as unrestricted a form as possible.
While it is frequently argued that compensation should go to people rather than governments, there is a strong rationale for providing some aid directly to local governments. 24 Public services are crucial to both individual well-being and to fi rm productivity, and rapid restoration of vital services and stable tax rates provides a credible signal to private fi rms that reinvestment in the affected area is economically justifi ed. Government action helps to solve a diffi cult problem of coordination for private fi rms in the aftermath of a disaster, since any individual fi rm may be reluctant to reinvest without the assurance that other fi rms will do so as well. Such coordination is a public good, whose benefi t is realized by all fi rms and landowners in the disaster area. Compensation to individuals also suffers from high transactions costs because of the dangers of fraud. In equity terms, compensation to governments, provided, of course, that it is competently managed, automatically provides proportionally greater benefi ts to low-than to high-income individuals. Moreover, compensation to governments is less likely to crowd out private charitable contributions, which in the 9/11 attack went mainly to individuals.
25
The 9/11 example suggests the important role for general budgetary compensation in limiting the disruptions from disasters. Dividing federal assistance to New York into tax expenditures versus direct aid, tax expenditures make up about one quarter of the total package of assistance. Take-up rates have been slow for the tax benefits and there is concern that they will expire before they are fully utilized. Compensation through tax benefi ts to fi rms is hard to monitor and is relatively ineffi cient compared to direct federal outlays. Though there is a natural tendency to want to set tight time limits on tax benefi ts, such time limits are undesirable. The rebuilding process from a natural disaster is likely to be relatively slow. The more a city is forced to commit funds in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, the greater is the likelihood that the net stimulative effect of the subsidies will be diminished, as only the more opportunistic fi rms and developers will be in a position to take advantage of the subsidies.
The New York experience also suggests that subsidies should not be tied just to the immediately affected area and that they should be fl exible as to the type of activity subsidized. Arbitrary geographic 23 The (lack of) state response in New York contrasts with the Los Angeles-Northbridge earthquake of 1993. In the latter case, the state of California levied a surtax on the state sales tax, with the proceeds used to repair damaged infrastructure. 24 Glaeser (2005) argues that New Orleans was too large, given its basic geography and productivity. Hence, it would be better to provide cash subsidies to individuals, which would allow them to relocate to more economically productive areas. 25 In the 9/11 attack, about $2.8 billion of charitable contributions were received (Dixon and Stern, 2004) . Most of these funds went to aid individual victims of 9/11 and fi rst responders.
demarcations for subsidies-for example, only the downtown area in Manhattan-raise questions of equity and reduce the net benefi ts per dollar of federal tax compensation. Trying to rebuild the damaged area to the status quo ante may not be the most effi cient policy. Subsidies should be geographically fl exible enough to allow the city to rebuild in the way that will most benefi t the city as a whole. Because a disaster that destroys capital may accelerate the gradual process of changing land uses-for example, from commercial to residential in lower Manhattan-tax subsidies should not be restricted to one type of land use, but should promote redevelopment patterns that are consistent with post-disaster market signals.
CONCLUSION
To summarize the economic impacts of 9/11, while the attack created substantial short-run dislocation, the long-run demand for city locations as a place to live or do business appears to have been little affected. Estimates suggest lost income for FY01-FY02 in the neighborhood of $5 billion attributable to lost jobs. Rental real estate markets weakened, but Downtown remained strong, perhaps in part because of targeted subsidies. Prices for Manhattan offi ce buildings, an indicator of long-run demand, increased by 12.6 percent relative to the nation between 2001 and 2003. The market for offi ce space in Midtown has been particularly strong, suggesting that 9/11 has accelerated the long-term shift in commercial activity from Downtown to Midtown. Demand for owner-occupied housing has been robust throughout the city.
Combined with a short-lived national recession, the 9/11 attack led to severe fi scal pressure on the city. Budget defi cits were addressed mainly through roughly equal amounts of additional debt and tax increases, plus modest expenditure cuts.
The present discounted value of costs of 9/11 through the public sector, including both tax losses and expenditure increases, are estimated to range from 0.7 percent to 1.35 percent of 2002 personal income, depending on the time period. Total federal compensation, through direct grants and tax expenditures, will ultimately equal about $20.4 billion. Fiscal relief to the government of New York City offsets about a third of the public sector costs. Inclusion of automatic federal cost sharing, through matching aid and tax deductibility, raises the federal offset to about half of the public sector costs. Because of linked tax bases, the state of New York shared heavily in the fi scal shock from 9/11. Rather than direct aid, the main state response has been to provide the city with enabling authority to raise debt and tax rates, and allowed the city temporarily to relax eligibility standards for Medicaid.
Though city economies are naturally resilient, the example of 9/11 suggests that a robust federal response can help to accelerate the recovery from natural disaster. The locality should bear as much of the cost of a disaster as its local economy permits. However, there is a strong case, both on equity and effi ciency grounds, for intergovernmental assistance, mainly from the federal government. Assistance in the form of general aid to local governments, by encouraging the rapid restoration of vital services and preventing sharp tax increases, can be effi cient in both minimizing the cost to individuals and providing a credible signal for reinvestment in the city. There is a role for both direct aid and tax expenditures, but the emphasis should be on the former. Tax expenditures should not be overly limited, both in the time and geography dimensions. Ex-ante rules, which specify that compensation will be only partial, forcing cities and states to share in the costs of recovery, can help to minimize moral hazards from underinvestment in safety.
